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THE LAW OF WIRE TAPPING*
MARGA'RET LYBOLT ROSENZWEIG
PART IV

The Law of Wire Tapping in the States
Wire tapping involves first a physical interference with wires before the
act of listening or interception of messages occurs. It was the first aspect
which apparently seemed of prime importance to the state legislatures in the
early days of telegraphic communication. Such acts appeared a double threat
to the property of the telegraph companies and to uninterrupted public service.
It is natural, therefore, that statutes prohibiting wire tapping should have
been entitled in many instances "Injuries to Property" or "Injuries to Public
Utilities" and included with the sections penalizing acts of malicious mischief.
The intention of the legislatures to protect property is further evidenced by
the provisions sometimes included for liability to the telegraph company for
damages sustained by it. 174 The statutes of some of the states even today
reflect only a concern with the physical interference with the "vires. A fewof these states do not forbid wire tapping per se, but prohibit only acts such
as injuring, cutting, molesting, or interfering with wires."' The statutes of
other states contain a clause forbidding "interference" with messages orcurrent, or interruption of the communication.176 In states in these two categories, wire tapping would be punishable only if it resulted incidentally in physical damage or interference with service in the manner prescribed. 17 By far the
*This is the second and final instalment of a study which was prepared for the New
York State Bar Association. The first instalment appeared in the June 1947 issue at32 17CORNELL
L. Q. 514.
4
NEv. Cozip. LAWS § 7652 (Hillyer, 1929).
17
5GA. CODE ANN. § 26-8114 (Park, et al.', 1936) (misdemeanor to destroy or injurewires or other property of a magnetic telegraph company) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4518.
(Burns, 1933); ME.REv. STAT., c. 139, § 12 (1930); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS, art.
27, § 579, art. 23, §§ 301, 304 (Flack, 1939) ; MINN. STAT. § 10423 (1927) ; Mo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 4526 (1942) ; N. H. REv. LAws, c. 442, § 3 (1942) ; VT. Pu4, LAWS § 6440'
(1933) ; W. VA. Co iE § 5970 (Michie, et al., 1943).
176Miss. CODE ANN. § 2381 (1942) ; S. C. CODE § 1201 (1942) ; R. I. GEN. LAws c.
608, § 73 (1938) ; TEX. STAT. PEN. CODE, art. 335 (Vernon, 1938).
17'Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Priest, 31 Civ. App. 345, 72 S.W.
241 (1903) held that -a cutting of dead wires was not an offense under a statute forbidding a cutting or. breaking "in such a manner as to interfere with the transmissior
of messages along the line." Wire tapping would seem not to be punishable under thisor similar provisions as it is usually accomplished without interference with the message.
In Young v. Young, 56 R.I. 401, 185 Atl. 901 (1936), an appeal from a decree of a
probate court, the court held properly admitted evidence. of telephone conversations of
the testatrix to which the contestant had listened by clamping radio headphones on the
wire. The court -stated that no part of the wire was destroyed, the free transmission of
the messages was preserved, and the communication was not distorted.
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greater number of states have provisions aimed specifically at wire tapping, 17s
although their statutes place various degrees of emphasis on the injury to
property and the interference with the right of privacy. In some states more
than one statute applicable to wire tapping has been enacted, the later one
apparently representing an increased concern over the more intangible rights
in need of protection. 179 Many of the states penalize not only wire tapping
but also communication or divulgence or use of wire tapped information.8 0
In some of these states, disclosure on order of the court is allowable, making
it clear that testimony concerning or arising out of wire tapped conversations
is not necessarily excluded.' 8 ' Delaware and New Jersey expressly forbid
testifying to wire tapped information. 182 In the other states, it has not been
178
ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 84 (18), tit..48, § 414 (1940) ; ARK. DIG. STAT. § 14255 (Pope,
1937) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, § 129 (Michie, et al, 1935); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6148
(1930); ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 130.19, 37.345 (Jones, 1936) (latter section deals only with
tapping for news dispatches) ; IOwA CODE § 13121 (Reichmann, 1939); KAN. GEN. STAT.
§ 17-1908 (Corrick, 1935); Ky. REv. STAT. § 433.430 (Cullen, 1946); LA. CODE CRIeM.
LAW & PROC. § 1183 (Dart, 1943) (expressly exempts officers of the law from provisions) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS, c. 272, § 99 (Michie, 1933) (prohibits tapping with intent
to procure information concerning any pfficial matter or to injure another, 2 years,
$1000) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 86-328 (1943) ; N. M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3705 (1941) ; N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (Michie, et al, 1943) ; TENN. CODE §§ 3103, 10863 (Michie, 1938);
VA. CODE § 4477 (Michie, et al., 1942) ; WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2656 (18) (Remington, 1932); Wis. STAT. §§ 343.43, 343.432, 348.37 (Brossard, 1945) (as to telephone

wires, tapping not forbidden; only injury) ; see the statutes cited in n. 180 infra, which
prohibit wire tapping as well as divulgence.
1 79
ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 14, § 84 (18), tit. 48, § 414 (Skinner, 1940); CAL. PEN. CODE
§§ 591, 641 (Deering, 1941); MONT. REv. CODES §§ 11466, 11494, 11518 (Anderson &

McFarland, 1935); NEv. ComP. LAWS §§ 487(18), 7645, 7650, 7652 (Hillyer, 1929);
N. D. Comp.' LAWS §§ 11043, 10078, 10231 (1913); R. I. GEN. LAWS, c. 608, §§ 47, 73
(1938).
180ARiz. CODE §§ 43-5403, 43-5405 (1939) (interception or divulgence, 5 years, $5000)
CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 591, 619, 640 (Deering, 1941) (divulgence, 5 years, $5000) ; DEL.
REV. CODE 5232, § 52 (1935); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 822.10 (1944); IDAHO CODE § 174505

(1932); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § '28.808 (Henderson, 1938) (2 years, $1000);
REV. CODES §§ 11466, 11494, 11518 (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) (disclosure
only of telegraph messages forbidden) ; NEv. Comp. LAWS §§ 10434, 7645, 7650 (Hillyer,
1929) (disclosure only of telegraph messages forbidden, but sections 7680 and 7681 seem
to extend this prohibition to telephone by blanket provisions) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:
171-1 (Peim. ed., 1939) (3 years, $1000) ; N. D. Comp. LAWS §§ 11078, 10231 (1913)
(disclosure forbidden only as to telegraph messages); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 13402
(Page, 1939) ; OKLA. STAT., tit. 21 §§ 1757, 1782 (1941) (not applicable to public officers;
testimony of others allowed on court order) ; ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-581, 112-510,
112-515, 112-527 (1940) (disclosure only of telegraph messages forbidden) ; PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 18, § 4688 (Purdon, Perm. ed.); R. I. Gen. Laws, c. 608, §§ 47, 48, 73
(1938)
(wire tapping and divulging forbidden only as telegraph messages; as to
telephone wires only injury forbidden) ; S. D. CODE §§ 13.4511, 13.4519 (1939) ; UTAI
CODE ANN. §§ 103-46-6, 103-46-11 (1943) ; Wyo. GEN STAT. §§ 32-355, 32-356 (Courtright,
1931) (5 years, $500).
8
1 'ARiz. CODE § 43-5405 (1939) ; CAL. PEN. CODE § 619 (Deering, 1941) ; N. D. ComP.
LAWS § 10078 (1913) ; MONT. Rav. CODES § 11518 (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) (only
-on1 82
telegraph) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21 § 1782 (1941).
DEL. REV. CODE 5232, § 52 (1935) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:171-1 (Perm. ed., 1939).
MONT.
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determined whether testimony is included in the prohibition against divulgence, although the construction of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act constitutes a precedent for so holding.-83 Some of the statutes expressly exempt public officers from the application of their provisions, 8 4 thus
declaring a policy of permitting this method of deticting crime and securing
evidence.
In most instances, the penalty for violation of these statutes is light and
the crime is a misdemeanor. 8 5 Some of the legislatures have not amended,
their wire tapping statutes since the introduction of the telephone, and in
these states the provisions refer only to telegraph wires and messages.'8s
It is debatable, however, whether the courts if called upon to interpret such
provisions might not hold them applicable to the telephone as well, for it
has been held that the term "telegraph" includes "telephone" under a statute
87
forbidding the cutting of telegraph wiresJ
As in the case of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, prosecutions for wire tapping in violation of .state statutes seem to have been rare.
In two reported cases, the prosecutions failed because the defendant's acts
were not within the terms of the governing statute. State v. Behringer,s&
like the later case of Goldman v. United States,8 9 involved listening to one
end of a telephone conversation without use of wire tapping. The defendant
was indicted under an Arizona statute which prohibited attempting to learn
the contents of any message "whilst the same is being sent over any telegraph
or telephone line." The defendant secretly placed a dictograph over the
transom of a hotel room in which there was a telephone transmitter, in order
to hear any message the occupants of the room might send over the telephone
' 83 Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937). Cases, note 139
supra show, however, that the courts have not interpreted the prohibition against di-

vulgence by telegraph employees to preclude testimony. See also subsequent discussion
in this part of the article as to whether section 605 of the Federal Communications Act
is 1binding
on state courts.
84
LA. CODE CRI,. LAW & PROC. § 1183 (Dart, 1943) ; OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 1782
(1941). The Massachusetts Eavesdropping Act apparently is not aimed at wire tapping
by public officers to secure evidence of crime since it penalizes wire tapping "with intent to procure information concerning any official 'matter or to injure another." See
Valli v. United States, 94 F. 2d 687 (C.C.A. 1st 1938), cert. granted 303 U. S. 632,
58 85
Sup. Ct. 760 (1938), dismissed 304 U.S. 586, 58 Sup. Ct. 1053 (1938).
Statutes providing a'long term of imprisonment or heavy fine are indicated ir
parenthesis,
notes 175, 178, 180 supra.
8
' 876Statutes which refer only to the telegraph are indicated in notes 175, 178, 180 supra.
. Davis v. Pacific Telephone Co., 127 Cal. 312, 59 Pac. 698 (1899). And see Attorney General v. Edison Telephone Co.; 6 Q.B.D. 244 (1880). Cf. Young v. Young,
56 R. I. 401, 185 Atl. 901 (1936).
18819 Ariz. 502, 172 Pac. 660 (1918).
189316 U. S.129,' 62 Sup. Ct. 993 (1942), discussed supra Part III-B.
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line. He connected the dictograph by a wire with the earpiece in another room.
The court held that the defendant had committed no offense, for he would
hear the messages as they were spoken into the transmitter and not while
being sent over the line. The court stated that the defendant was an eaves-,
dropper, and it expressed regret that the law did not reach him. One judge
dissented. In State v. Nordskog,190 the defendant, as in the Behringer case,
was a private individual. He was employed by a newspaper to tap the wires
of a detective agency. The charge was framed under the Washington statute
making it a misdemeanor wilfully and maliciously to "remove, damage, or
destroy" a telephone line. The court found that the manner of tapping, which
was accomplished by attaching thread-like wires through the cable box of
the telephone apparatus, did not cause damage within the wording of the
statute. It pointed out that the subtitle of the statute, "Injuring Public
Utilities," indicated that its purpose was to preserve the efficiency of public
utilities, and that to offend against it there must be such injury to the property that it would not meet the ordinary tests of efficiency. Despite its interpretation, this court also thought, like the Arizona court in the Behringer case,
that the defendant's act deserved punishment. "The record before us warrants
the assertion that there has been altogether too much of this form of pilfering
going on in this state, and the omission of the law now disclosed calls aloud
for legislative action."
The Olmstead decision of the United States Supreme Court, although an
interpretation of* the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution having
no binding effect on state courts, has influenced them in deciding whether
wire tapping is a search and seizure within the meaning of their bills of
rights.' 91 A Maryland statute192 provides that no evidence in the trial of
misdemeanors shall be deemed admissible if it has been procured by an illegal search and seizure or a search or seizure prohibited by the Declaration
of Rights. The Maryland Court of Appeals; citing the Olmstead case, held
in Hitzelberger v. State193 and Leon v. State 9 that this section did not preclude the admission of evidence secured through the use of wire tapping,
inasmuch as wire tapping was not a search or seizure. 195
10o76 Wash. 472, 136" Pac. 694 (1913).

191See discussion of applicability of Fourth Amendment of Federal Constitution to

state
courts, Part II-B, s'upra.
' 92Mn. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAws, art. 35, § 5 (Flack, 1939).
193174 Md. 152, 197 Atl. 605 (1938).
194180 Md. 279, 23 A. 2d. 706 (1941), cert. denied, sub. nora. Neal v. State, 316 U. S.
680,9562 Sup. Ct. 1107 (1942).
1 The court in Young v. Young, 56 R.I. 401, 185 At. 901 (1936), discussed supra,
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The inefficacy of the law in most states with regard to wire tapping and
admissibility of wire tapped evidence makes it the more important to determine how far the law which has arisen out of section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act is applicable in the states. The Weiss case decided that
section 605 extends so far as to prohibit the introduction in a federal court
of evidence secured through interception of intrastate messages. The question remains whether section 605 proscribes the admission in state courts of
evidence secured in violation of its terms.
This problem, like all those dealing with the interrelation of federal and
state law is so complex that it is worthy of a detailed study and only an outline of the principal considerations can be suggested here. It appears that a
strong case could be made for holding that the federal statute governs the
admission in the state courts of evidence secured either directly or indirectly
by wire tapping. The second clause of section 605 provides that "no person
. . . shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish . . . to any
person. . . ." The broad terms "no person" and "any person" are applicable

on their face to a witness in a state court. The word "divulge" was construed
in the first Nardone case to prohibit testimony of intercepted conversations,
and the policy of the statute was declared in the second Nardone decision
to compel the extension of the prohibition to evidence secured even indirectly
by wire tapping. If the effect of the statute as so construed is limited to
exclusion of evidence in the federal courts, the protection afforded by it
against invasion of privacy would be narrowed to the vanishing point, for
the bulk of criminal prosecutions occur in the state courts; and moreover,
many criminal offenses normally prosecuted in federal courts could by technical changes in the indictments be prosecuted in state courts, and all the
note 177, also considered the Ohstead decision in holding that there was no bar to
admission of wire tapped evidence.
Ex parte McDonough, 21 Cal. App. 2d 287, 68 P. 2d 1020 (1937), was on petition
for a writ of habeas corpus by a petitioner who was imprisoned for contempt on refusal
to answer as a witness certain questions before the grand jury concerning wire tapping
by police officers. His refusal was based on the belief that should he answer, he would
be aiding in the unlawful use of such information. The court, without referring to the
California statutes, or the Ohnstead case, held that there was no ground for petitioner's
discharge from custody, since the unlawful manner of obtaining evidence is no reason
for discarding it and petitioner, in answering the questions, would not be abetting an
unlawful act. The opinion seems to overlook that "use" of wire tapped information,
even in a court room, might be a crime under California statutes. CAL. PEN. CODE §§
619, 640 (Deering, 1941).
People v. Pustau, 39 Cal. App. 2d 407, 103 P. 2d 224 (1940), and State v. Raasch,
201 Minn. 158, 275 N.W. 620 (1937), raised the question of admissibility of evidence
secured by wire tapping, but only on the basis of identificatioi of the parties to the
conversations.
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wire tapped evidence secured by federal officers would be available in such
prosecutions. Both the wording of the statute and the policy behind it indicate therefore, that it was intended to apply to state courts as well ag federat
courts.
It may of course be an answer to this line of reasoning that the broad ban
on "divulgence" in the federal statute was not intended to apply to the state
courts because Congress cannot constitutionally impose restraint on their procedure. Such was the holding in two Maryland cases, although the court
entered into no extensive analysis of the question. 96 The Supreme Court
of California, on the other hand has on several occasions made its rulings on
9
the assumption that section 605 was applicable to testimony in state courts.1 7
The sounder view would seem to be, that in pursuance of its power to regulate interstate commerce, and in order to preserve the inviolability of interstate communications, Congress may direct that no testimony concerning wire
tapped conversations shall be received in any court. The federal law has.
reached into procedure in state courts in other instances. The provision of
the Bankruptcy Act that no testimony by the bankrupt "shall be offered in
evidence against him in any criminal proceeding"' 98 has been held applicable
to subsequent criminal proceedings in state courts. 199 It has been held also
that internal revenue agents, prohibited by treasury department regulations.
from divulging official information, may not be compelled by state courts to
testify in the forbidden manner.200 A close analogy to the present problem
is found in the decisions of the state courts concerning the effect of the
federal stamp law which provided for the exclusion from evidence "in any
court" of documents not stamped as prescribed by the statute. The majority
of state courts held that the words "in any court" were not intended to regulate state tribunals inasmuch as Congress was not empowered to enact a
196 Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A. 2d 706 (1941), cert. denied sub nor. Neal v.
State, 316 U. S. 680, 62 Sup. Ct. 1107 (1942) ; Rowan v. State, 175 Md. 547, 3 A. 2d
753 (1938) ; GREENMAN, WIRE TAPPING, ITS RELATION To CIVIL LIBERTIES 35 (1938) ;
Notes, 25 MINN. L. REv. 382 (1941); 30 J. CRIm. L. 945 (1940); 18 N. C. L. REv.
229 (1940). Cf. Note 34 ILL. L. REv. 758 (1940).
'9 7 People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. 2d 169, 137 P. 2d 1 (1943), Aff'g 122 P. 2d 655 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist., 1942), appeal dismissed sub norm. Kelley v. State, 320 U. S. 715, 64 Sup.
Ct. 264 (1944) ; People v. Vertlieb, 22 Cal. 2d 193, 137 P. 2d 437 (1943) ; People v.
Onofrio, 65 Cal. App. 2d 584, ],51 P. 2d 158 (1944) ; People v. Barnhart, 66 Cal. App.
2d 714, 153 P. 2d. 214 (1944).
19830 STAT. 548 (1898), amended 52 STAT. 847 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 25 a (10) (1940).
199People v. Lay, 193 Mich.' 17, 159 N.W. 299 (1916); People v. Elliott, 123 Misc.
602,
20 206 N. Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 20 Sup. Ct. 701 (1900) ; Stegall v. Thurman,.
175 Fed. 813 (N.D. Ga. 1910).
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law of such scope.2 0 The better reasoned minority view that unstamped
-documents are inadmissible in state courts is expressed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court as follows: "The purpose of Congress was not to make rules
-of evidence, but to stamp the instrument of evidence, with a disqualification,
'2 2
which will prevent its use as evidence until the delinquent has paid his tax." 0
Similarly, it may be said of the application of section 605, that its purpose
is to prevent the use of tapped conversations in evidence in order to discourage interception of interstate communications.
The crucial phase of the question of the extent of the federal law is the
obligation of state courts to enforce it. Can they not disregard it as they
would any other extra-jurisdictional legislation? The United States Supreme
Court has given a definite answer in the negative to a similar query posed
in the recent case of Testa ef al. v. Katt.20 3 It was there held that a state
court having jurisdiction was bound by the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution 2° 4 to enforce a claim under a section of the Emergency
Price Control Act providing that a buyer of goods above the prescribed ceiling price might sue the seller "in any court of competent jurisdiction" for
-not more than three times the amount of the overcharge. Reaffirming a holding in a previous case,20 5 the Court, 20 6 stated:
"It repudiated the assumption that federal laws can be considered by
the states as though they were laws emanating from a foreign sovereign.
Its teaching is that the constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it
are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states, courts and
the people, 'any-thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.' It asserted that the obligation of states to
enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason of the form in which
they are cast or the remedy which they provide."
The opinion thus leaves little room for doubt that a state court confronted
with evidence secured in violation of the provisions of section 605 must constitutionally reject it if the federal statute is construied to apply to divulgence
of wire tapped evidence in state courts or proceedings. If this view should
be correct, the principle of the Testa case would be extremely important and
20118
202

N. C. L. Rav. 229 (1940).

Chartiers and Robinson Turnpike Co. v. McNamara, 72 Pa. 278, 281 (1872).
203330
U. S.386, 67 Sup. Ct. 810 (1947).
20 4
ArT. VI, § 2, reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
-shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and

the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary -notwithstanding."
20 5
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1876).

200330 U. S.386, 392, 67 Sup. Ct. 810, 813 (1947).
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far reaching in the law of wire tapping. It would be immaterial that the
state had declared itself in favor of permitting the police to tap wires under
certain safeguards, as has been the case in New York. The Testa case is.
positive in holding that no conflict of policy between the federal and state
law would excuse the state from enforcing a federal statute. Thus the federal
law of wire tapping would be established as all pervasive, and any conflicting
state law, a nullity. While doubt is cast on the constitutionality of the New
York provisions with regard to wire tapping, it is important to explore fully
all ramifications of those provisions. This discussion, therefore, will be without regard to the foregoing analysis of the applicable principle of the Federal
Constitution.
PART V

The Law of Wiring Tapping in New York State
The law of wire tapping in New York grew up haphazardly, with only
one half-hearted attempt to improve it on the part of the 1938 Constitutional
Convention. With so little tending, it developed punily, unfitted to cope with
official determination to track down criminals by any means available. Some
of this weakness it inherited from the New York law of search and seizure.
The latter will therefore be examined briefly insofar as it has a bearing on
the law of wire tapping.
Until recently, th6 only guarantee in New York State against unreasonable
searches and seizures was statutory. This provision, slightly amended as ta
wording,20 7 is still found in section 8 of the Civil Rights Law. It follows the
wording of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, reading as follows:
"The -right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and
no %varrantscan issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons.
or thifigs to be seized." Since the Federal Constitution contains no guarantee
against this form of infringement applicable to the states,2 0 8 the right of the
people of New York was dependent solely on the section just quoted. In
1938, however, on recommendation of the Constitutional Convention, an
amendment to the state Constitution was adopted which eleyated the right
20
TUntil amended in 1923, the first clause read: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
ought
208 not to be violated ..
See Part III supra.
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to a constitutional guarantee. The amendment, contained in Article 1, section
12 of the Constitution is almost identical with its statutory counterpart.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was still only
statutory, the courts were frequently confronted with the question whether
,evidence seized in violation of that right, should be received. In 1903, the
Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative in People v. Adams. 20 9 The facts
,of this case have already been set forth in the discussion of Adams v. New
York, in which the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the New York court.2 10 Without stating whether the papers which were offered in evidence were legally or illegally seized, the Court of Appeals held
in accordance with the common law rule that the court "when trying a criminal cause, will not take notice of the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves of papers, or other articles of personal property which are
material and properly offered in evidence."
The lower courts did not follow the Adams decision undeviatingly. AIparently because of the influence of the Weeks case, several held that evidence
21
obtained by illegal means must be returned on motion made before trial. '
Others held to the contrary, although the opinions seem to stress the fact
that the disputed evidence was contraband or a nuisance, as a reason for not
suppressing it, and do not declare unequivocably in favor of the common
2 12
law view.
Any doubt concerning the position of New York was settled by the decision in 1926 of People v. Defore.213 The defendant in that case was con209176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903).
210192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904), discussed Part II-A supra.
211
People v. DeVasto, 198 App. Div. 620, 190 N. Y. Supp. 816 (2d Dep't 1921);
People v. Manko, 189 N. Y. Supp. 357 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd iem., 203 App. Div. 853,
196 N. Y. Supp 944 (Ist Dep't 1922); People v. Kinney, 185 N. Y. Supp. 645 (Sup.
Ct. 1920); People v. Jakira, 118 Misc. 303, 193 N. Y. Supp. 306 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ;
People v. Dineen, 118 Misc. 295, 192 N. Y. Supp. 905 (Bronx Co. Ct. 1922) ; People
v. 738 Bottles of Intoxicating Liquor, 116 Misc. 252, 190 N. Y. Supp. 477 (Saratoga
Co. Ct. 1921); State v. One Hudson Cabriolet Auto, 116 Misc. 399, 190 N. Y. Supp.
481 (Saratoga Co. Ct. 1921). See also Matter of Horschler, 116 Misc. 243, 190 N. Y.
Supp.
355 (Richmond Co. Ct. 1921) (on application for writ of habeas corpus).
2 2
1 People v. McDonald, 177 App. Div. 806, 165 N. Y. Supp. .41 (2d Dep't 1919);
Peopl- v. Pomerantz. 125 Misc. 570. 211 N. Y. Supp. 767 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; In re Seracusa,
125 Misc. 882, 212 N. Y. Supp. 400 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Fusaro v. McKennell, 120 Misc.
434, 198 N. Y. Supp. 719 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (independent proceeding for injunction) ; People v. Bowen, 120 Misc. 342, 198 N. Y. Supp. 306 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; People v. Esposito,
118 Misc. 867, 194 N. Y. Supp. 326 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; People v. Richer, 127 Misc. 410,
217 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Bronx Co. Ct. 1926); People v. Wicka, 117 Misc. 364, 192 N. Y.
Supp. 633 (Erie Co. Ct. 1921). People v. Hawkins, 132 Misc. 696, 230 N. Y. Supp.
152 (Niagara Co. Ct. 1928), following the Defore case, was to the same effect.
213242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), affirning 213 App. Div. 643, 211 N. Y. Supp.
134 (Ist Dep't 1925), cert. denied sutb nom. Defore v. New York, 270 U. S. 657, 46
Sup. Ct. 353 (1925).
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victed of possessing a dangerous weapon. The evidence showed that a police
officer had arrested the defendant in the hall of his boardinghouse on a charge
of stealing an overcoat worth less than fifty dollars. A search of the defendant's room after the arrest led to the discovery of a blackjaclPin a bag.
-The defendant was later acquitted of the charge of larceny, but he was convicted as a second offender for possession of the weapon. A motion before
trial to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search was illegal, was
denied.
The Court of Appeals, by Judge Cardozo, held that because defendant's
arrest was unlawful, it conferred no right to make an incidental search of
the premises. The search and seizure were consequently illegal. The court
nevertheless affirmed the conviction for the reason that the evidence secured
by an unlawful act is admissible under the decision in the Adams case. "The
officer might have been resisted, or sued for damages or even prosecuted for
6ppression (Penal Law, sections 1846, 1847). He was subject to removal
or other discipline at the hands of his superiors. '214 These liabilities attended
a violation of section 8 of the Civil Rights Law, but the court refused to
attach further consequences unless some public policy required them. It found
on examination that exclusion of evidence unlawfully seized would affect society adversely. "The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power through
overzeal or indiscretion to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the
most flagitious .... We may not subject society. to these dangers until the
Legislature has spoken with clearer voice.1 215 In response to the argument
that the protection of the statute would become illusory unless the evidence
should be excluded, fhe court pointed to the case of Entick v. Carringtol,216
which established the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in
English law. That was a suit by the victim of a raid against the messengers
who ransacked his premises, and resulted in a substantial verdict. The Court
of Appeals thought that a modern jury would not be "more indifferent to
its liberties" than "when the immunity was born." The Court reviewed the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court following the Weeks case, but
found that the majority of the states were still opposed to the federal rule.
It criticized the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between evidence
secured by federal officers and state police as follows: "The professed object
of the trespass rather than the official character of the trespasser should test
the rights of government .... The incongruity of other tests gains emphasis
214
1d.
2 5
1 d.

at 19, 150 N. E. at 586.
at 23, 24, 150 N. E. at 588.21619 How. St. Tr. 1030 (1765).

19471

WIRE TAPPING

from the facts of the case before us. The complainant, the owner of the
,overcoat, co-operated with the officer in the arrest and the attendant search.
'Their liowers were equal, 'since the charge was petit larceny, a misdeineanor ....

If one spoke or acted for the State, so also did the other. A

government would be disingenuous, if, in determining the use that should
be made of evidence drawn from such a source, it drew a line between them.
This would be true whether they had cted in concert or apart. We exalt
form above substance when we hold that the use is made lawful because the
intruder is without a badge of office. ' 21 1
The defendant contended that admission of the illegally seized evidence
would constitute a denial of his rights under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article
1, section 6 of the State Constitution, which confers an immunity against
self-incrimination. As to the first, the court restated the well esablished rule
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee against infringement by
the states of the privileges against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches
and seizures. It was further held that Article 1, section 6 of the State Constitution was inapplicable because it was limited "to cases where incriminatory
disclosure had been extorted by the constraint of legal process directed
against a witness."
The Defore case, the first pronouncement of the Court of Appeals after
the Weeks decision, arrayed New York with the states following the majority
rule in admitting illegally seized evidence. Since a motion had been made
before trial, it obviated any possibility that later cases might reach a contrary
result by. holding, as often occurred in other states, that d collateral issue
could not be considered on trial, but that the illegal seizure might be cohtested by a preliminary application.
The Defore case is usually cited as directly opposed to -the Weeks case,
and this is correct so far as it concerns the intention of the Court of Appeals
and its basic policy towards illegally seized evidence. Technically, however,
the Weeks and Defore cases are reconcilable. The United States Supreme
Court was ruling in the Weeks case with reference to evidence seized in violation of a constitutional right, which it clearly distinguished in later cases
from statutory rights even when the illegal act was committed by public officers, as in the Olnstead case. The Defore case is comparable in some ways
to this latter class of cases in that it concerned the obtention of evidence by
violation only of a statutory right,-that created by section 8 of the Civil
Rights Law.
2 7

1

People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 22, 23, 150 N. E. 585, 588 (1926).
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The ruling of the Defore case and the position of New York State with
regard to admission of illegally seized evidence was the subject of animated
debate at the Constitutional Convention of 1938. The form of the safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures which was finally recommended
by the Convention for adoption, followed the wording of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and made no provision for the exclusion
of evidence secured in violation of its terms.
The omission of such a provision was bitterly debated, and the approval
of the present form was due in part to the vote of delegates who hoped the
Legislature or the courts would remedy the omission.2 18 Time has proved
the falsity of these hopes. The Legislature has taken no.action, and the courts
when the question has been presented, have followed the Adams and Defore
cases in construing the 1938 amendment to the Constitution.2 1 9 the refusal
of the Convention to adopt a clause excluding illegally seized evidence has
in fact been taken as a clear indication that no change in the law was intended.220 The most recent ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point was
in 1943 in People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc. 221 The evidence in that case
consisted of a diamond ring displayed in the defendant's store window with
a tag attached reading, "1Ct. Perfect Diamond." The ring and tag were taken
by an inspector in the belief that the tag was false. On an appeal from a
conviction for publishing a misleading advertisement, the, Court of Appeals
refused to pass upon the defendant's contention that the seizure was unlawful.
It restated the rule of the Adams and Defore cases that the court will not
notice the manner of obtaining evidence and held that this was unaffected by
the incorporation of the statutory provision into the Constitution without
change of language. It did not comment on the distinction sometimes drawn
by the courts and commentators between evidence obtained through infringement of constitutional rights and in violation of a statute. It might have
2182 REv. REcorD, NEW YORK CoNsr. CoN. 818-827 (1938).

2 9
1 People v. Belsky, 177 Misc. 125, 29 N. Y. S.. 2d 535 (Kings Co. Ct. 1941),
and cases note 216 infra. See also Bloodgood v. Lynch, 293 N. Y. 308, 56 N. E. 2d

718 (1944); People v. Fay, 182 Misc. 358, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
Contra:
In re Atlas Lathing Corp., 176 Misc. 959, 29 N. Y. S. 458 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
22

OPeople v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N. Y. 161, 51 N. E. 2d 690 (1943), aff'g

People v. Richter, 265 App. Div. 767, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 751 (1st Dep't 1943) ; People
v. Kuhn, 172 Misc. 1097, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 1005 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1939); People v. La
Combe, 170 Misc. 669, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 877 (Magis. Ct. 9th Dist. 1939). See also People
v. Richter, 182 Misc. 96, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 114, 122 (Magis. Ct. S. I. 1943). The Supreme Court of Louisiana employed the'same argument in holding illegally seized evidence admissible after refusal by the Louisiana Constitutional Convention to adopt an
of evidence clause. State v. Fleckinger, 152 La. 338, 93 So. 115 (1922).
exclusion
22 1
See note 220 vtpra.
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employed this distinction as theoretical justification for rejecting evidence
seized in violation of the new guarantee contained in the Constitution, but
it preferred, more realistically, to hold that the case before it was governed
by the Adams and Defore cases, which presented similar facts.
The Constitutional Convention of 1938 also adopted a proposal guaranteeing the right of security against unreasonable interception of telephone and
telegraph communications. Before the effects of this provision are considered,
however, some reference is necessary to the earlier law of wire tapping in
New York. Section 639, subdivision 7 of the Penal Code of 1881 forbade
the displacement, removal, injury or destruction of telegraph lines or apparatus. In 1892, in an act entitled, "An Act to amend section six hundred
and thirty-nine of Chapter fourteen of the Penal Code of the State of New
York, relating to malicious mischiefs and other injuries to prbperty,'

' 222

the

earlier section was expanded into the provision now contained in section
1423, subdivision 6 of the Penal Law. This section reads, "A person who
wilfully or maliciously displaces, removes, injures or destroys: . . . 6. A

line of telegraph or telephone, wire or cable, pier or abutment, or the material or property belonging thereto, without lawful authority, or shall unlawfully and wilfully cut, break, tap or make connection with any telegraph
or telephone line, wire, cable or instrument, or read or copy in any unauthorized manner any message, communication or report passing- over it, in
this state; or who shall wilfully prevent, obstruct or delay, by any means
or contrivance whatsoever, the sending, transmission, conveyance or delivery,
in this state of any authorized message, communication or report by or through
any telegraph or telephone line, wire or cable, under the control of any telegraph or telephone company doing business in this state; or who shall aid,
agree with, employ or conspire with afiy person or persons to unlawfully do,
or permit or cause to be done, any of the acts hereinbefore mentioned, or
who shall occupy, use a line, or shall knowingly permit another to occupy,
use a line, a room, table, establishment or apparatus to unlawfully do or
cause to be done any of the acts hereinbefore mentioned . . . is punishable

by imprisonment for not more than two years." The section is included in
the Article on "Malicious Mischief." The only other section of the Penal
Law under which the act of wire tapping might be indictable is section 552,
subdivision 1, which provides, "A person who: 1. Wrongfully obtains, or
attempts to obtain, any knowledge of a telegraphic or a telephonic message
by connivance with a clerk, operator, messenger, or other employee of a
22

2N. Y. Laws 1892, vol. I, c. 372.
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. is punisfhable by a fine of not more

than one thousand dollars' or by imprisonment for not more than two years,
or by both such fine and imprisonment." Under the latter section, however,
proof of connivance would be required, an element usually absent, especially
in the cases of public officers who employ their own professional wire tappers.
A reading of section 1423, subdivision 6 is by itself sufficient to raise strong
doubts whether an officer of law tapping a wire in the scope of his duties,
would be guilty of the offense therein described. The title and placing of
the section indicate that it was aimed at acts of malicious mischief. To come
-within the terms of the section, the act of tapping must be done "unlawfully
and wilfully." That official wire tapping is not conduct of this description
is confirmed by the cases construing this section. It has been held that a
person who removed telephone wires from his premises when his service was
discontinued on his failure to pay dues did not act "unlawfully and wilfully." 223 The court said: "This is a penal statute and must be strictly construed. The act of the defendant was intentional, headstrong, and voluntary.
In order to find him guilty of the crime charged, the court must find that
his act was wantonly malicious and done with desire and intention to injure
the complainant and destroy its property." The Court of Appeals, held that
an inspector for a park commission, who, acting for the commission, had
disconnected a water pipe, was not guilty of an offense of "wilfully or maliciously" disconnecting a water pipe. "The word 'wilfully', in the statute,
means something more than a voluntary act, and more, also, than an intentional act which in fact is wrongful. It includes the idea of an act intentionally done with a wrongful purpose, or with a design to injure another, or
one committed out of mere wantonness or lawlessness. ''224 The only direct
reference by a'court to the applicability of section 1423 (6) to official wire
tapping is found in People v. Hebberd225 in which the judge, sitting as committing magistrate, stated that the complaint against one of the defendants,
a police commissioner, had been dismissed in open court "for the all-sufficient
reason that it was conclusively established that he had committed no crime,
but that, on the contrary, the knowledge of conversations conducted over the
telephone wires in question was acquired solely in his official capacity as police commissioner for the purpose of detecting crime and which, in fact, resulted in the conviction of a number of individuals, and that the knowledge
of such conversations was only utilized for the purpose of detecting sus223
224 People

v. Raeder, 161 Misc. 557, 292 N. Y. Supp. 447 (Del. Co. Ct. 1937)_
Wass v. Stephens, 128 N. Y. 123, 128, 28 N. E. 945, 947 (1891).
22596 Misc. 617, 162 N. Y. Supp. 80 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
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pected criminality." The statute under which the police commissioner had
been charged was not cited.
The New York statutes make it a misdemeanor for an officer to exceed
his authority in executing a search warrant or to seize property without a
warrant. 226 It is unlikely, however, that these sections would be held applicable to an officer making an unlawful interception, inasmuch as the Olinstead case holding that wire tapping was not a search or a seizure, would
probably be followed by the courts of this state as it has been in other states.
The constitutional provision adopted in 1938 forms the second paragraph
of section 12 of Article I, of which the first paragraph is composed of the
recently adopted guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
second paragraph reads:
"The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception
of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and ex
parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus
obtained, and identifying the particular means of communications, and
particularly describing the person or persons whose communications are
to be intercepted and the purpose thereof."
In 1942 the Legislature enacted section 813-a of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to provide a procedure whereby warrants for interception might
be issued as required by the Constitution. That section reads:
"Sec. 813-a. Ex parte order for interception.
An ex parte order for the interception of telegraphic or telephonic
communications may be issued by any justice of the general sessions of
the county court or of the court of general sessions of the county of
New York upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the
attorney-general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, that
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus
obtained and identifying the particular telephone line, or means of communication and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof. In connection
with the issuance of such an order the justice or judge may examine on
oath the applicant and any other witness he may produce for the purpose
of satisfying himself of the existence of reasonable grounds for the
granting of such application. Any such order shall be effective for the
time specified therein but not for a period of more than six months unless
extended or renewed by the justice or judge who signed and issued the
2 26

N. Y. PENAL LAW'§§ 1846, 1847; CODE Cims. PRoc. § 812. See People v. Defore,
242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926) on construction of PENAL LAW § 1847.
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original order upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal
is in the public interest. Any such order together with the papers upon
which the application was based shall be delivered to and retained by
the applicant as authority for intercepting or directing the interception
of the telegraphic or telephonic communications transmitted over the instrument or instruments described. A true copy of such order shall at
all times be retained in his possession by the judge or justice issuing
the same."
With the adoption of the foregoing provision, New York became the first
zstate to provide a procedure for supervised wire tapping. The method provided resembles the procedure prescribed by federal law for interception of
mail by post office employees on authorization of the Postmaster General in
-case the employee has reason to believe mailable matter is being transported
-contrary to law.227 In the case of wire tapping, application to a court for
a warrant seemed preferable to issuance of an order by the chief prosecuting
-officer, who might be unduly prejudiced in favor of using this method of
investigation on a wide scale to secure convictions. The procedure provided
by section 813-a is calculated to insure secrecy in the issuance of the order,
and thus preserve the value of the wire tapping operation.
The only case reference to either of the new provisions is contained in
-Martinelliv. Valentine,22 1 which was an application for a peremptory writ
of mandamus to the Police Commissioner of New York City requiring the
return to the petitioner of six telephone instruments detached and removed
by city policemen from petitioner's premises. The court granted the appli-cation; holding the seizure illegal and pointing out that no criminal charges
had been preferred against the petitioner. The Commissioner attempted to
justify his acts on the ground that the telephones were being used unlawfully
to transmit racing information. The court, referring to the right of interception of messages permitted under Article I, section 12 of the Constitution,
stated that it was difficult to understand why the petitioner's wires were not
-tapped under order, and sufficient evidence obtained to indict.
Prior to 1938, the law of New York afforded no solid basis for holding
that an officer acted illegally in taplping, wires to secure evidence of crime.
No reason existed therefore for exclusion of evidence so obtained. Even
had official wire tapping been illegal, it was to be expected that New York, as
-one of the states which admit illegally seized evidence, would receive evidence of wire tapped conversations. Such was the holding in People v. Mc227Rzv. STAT. § 4026 (1872), 39
228179

U.S.C.A. § 700 (1926).
Misc. 486, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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Donald,229 a decision of the Appellate Division in 1917. The defendant in
that case contended that evidence secured by the police in tapping wires leading to his house was illegally obtained and should be excluded. The court
ruled that it was unnecessary to decide whether such conduct was prohibited
by section 552 or section 1423 (6) of the Penal Law, for the doctrine of
the Adams case controlled and no "collateral" inquiry would be permitted
as to how the evidence had been secured.
Twenty years later, evidence of intercepted conversations was admitted
by the Appellate Division in disbarment proceedings against an attorney for
aiding and abetting in the "policy" racket. 230 The court emphasized that
the wires were not tapped in order to secure evidence for the present proceding, but that the proffered testimony related to conversations intercepted
by federal agents and police officials before the disbarment proceeding was'
commenced or even contemplated, in order to secure evidence against a notorious criminal. The court warned of the dangers of indiscriminate wire
tapping and said, "This is especially true when the wires of a lawyer's office
are tapped. Not only the business of the attorney is disclosed but that of
every person who calls the attorney. By that means the privileged communications and conversations as well as the secrets of his clients and their
private business is pried into by strangers." 23 The court implied that evidence secured by tapping the wires of any attorney or other person except
in connection with spspected crime, would be inadmissible, but it did not
explain why such consequences would attend acts which, so far as shown,
would not have been illegal.
There is no reason to suppose that the adoption of the coistitutional prohibition against unreasonable interception of wire communications has
changed the law with regard to admissibility. If the statutory procedure
prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure is followed, no question arises
under the New York law. Even if this procedure is disregarded, however,
the evidence thereby secured is apparently admissible. The constitutional
provision stamps indiscriminate wire tapping as illegal, but does not state
that the results of such methods shall be exclusion of the evidence. Reasoning parallel to that in People v. Richter's Jewelers leads to the conclusion
that the failure of the Constitutional Convention to provide for the exclusion
of evidence of illegally intercepted conversations, particularly in the' face of
229177 App. Div. 806, 165 N. Y. Supp.
2301n re Davis, 252 App. Div. 591, 299

41 (2d Dep't 1917).
N. Y. Supp. 632 (1st Dep't 1937).
231252 App. Div. 591, 598, 299 N. Y. Supp. 632, 640 (1st Dep't 1937).
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two decisions admitting such evidence, must be taken as an indication that
no such result was intended.
The inquiry is natural at this point as to what legal effect attaches to disobedience of the constitutional and statutory provisions for supervised wire
tapping. The constitution states, "The right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not
be violated." It purports to create a right, but it is difficult to determine how
that right may be enforced. No penal sanction existed, so far as public officers were concerned, prior to 1938, and none has since been created. Evidence secured in violation of the constitutional provision appears to be admissible.. Is the citizen whose rights are invaded by unreasonable eavesdropping on his private wires to be relegated to a civil action against the interlopers? This would seem to be a slender security and a slight deterrent against
official transgression of constitutional rights.
PART VI

Analysis of the Considerationc Supporting the Conflicting Views as to
the Practice of Wire Tapping.
Opinions concerning the extent of protection the law should afford against
wire tapping by the police are divided sharply into two categories,-those
favoring legalized wire tapping under supervision of the courts or a superior
officer232 and those favoring an absolute prohibition against official wire tapping.23 3 The other extreme, allowing the police free rein in the use of this
method, has not won approval from hny commentator, probably because the
analogy to searehes and seizures suggests that wire tapping should at least
be subject to the test of reasonableness and to some effectual control, as by
the issuance of warrants.
The basic consideration at the root of the policy of permitting supervised
wire tapping is the effectiveness of this weapon in combatting crime. 234 Ac232

Professor Wigmore is in the forefront of those advocating wire tapping on condition that it is properly supervised. 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 b (3d. ed. 1940). See
also GREENMAN, WIRE TAPPING, ITS RELATION TO CIVIL LIAERTiES 44 (1939) ; Plumb,

Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 337, 367 (1939) ; Notes, 53 HARv. L
REV. 863 (1940), 28 GEO. L. J. 789 (1940).

233Wire Tapping, Congress and the Department of Justice, 9 INT'L. JUlD. Ass'N.

; 32 LAW NoTEs 683 (1929).
BULL.
2 3 4 97 (1941)
Enforcement officers seem to differ in their estimates of the value of wire tapping.
District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey called it "one of the best methods available for
uprooting certain types of crime." 1 REv. REcoRD N. Y. CoNsr. CoN. 372 (1938). J. E.
Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, termed it an archaic, and inefficient practice which "has proved a definite handicap or barrier in the development
of ethical, scientific, and sound investigative technique." Letter to HarvardLaw Review,
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cording to this view, the police should be permitted to avail themselves of
every means even though morally reprehensible, in order to apprehend the
dangerous criminals with whom they must deal. To fail in this function
would bring the law into greater disrepute, it is argued, than to employ a
method generally condemned. The police should not be expected to maintain
a high level of "fair play" against the enemies of society who do not abide
by any such rules.2 35 A complete ban on wire tapping would allow criminals
to further their schemes over the telephone without fear of police interception. Even if the telephone communication itself should constitute a violation of the law, as in the case of conspiracy or unlawfully disclosing information affecting national defense, 236 the police would be severely handicapped in discovering it.2 37 The right of privacy in use of the telephone
should not be protected to a greater extent than one's house or papers under
the Fourth Amendment; the police should have the right to intercept messages for the purpose of crime detection to a reasonable extent, under regulations similar to those embodied in the New York Code of Crimiiial Procedure. Such plan minimizes the danger feared by those who oppose even
supervised wire tapping, that a system of political espionage may be established. Such fear is groundless in any event, so long as it is not a crime
to hold an opinion, and a government bent on undermining constitutional
guarantees would not be deterred from using wire tapping to further its end
regardless of the stringency of the laws against it. But even conceding that
legalized wire tapping carries with it certain dangers and disadvantages, the
law should sanction its use under proper supervision lest the police should
yield to the temptation to resort to this method in the face of a statute forbidding it and indiscriminate wire tapping result. So runs the argument of
the proponents of this view.
The advocates of an absolute prohibition against the use of wire tapping
by the police stress its inherent danger to the right of privacy. Whatever
Feb. 9, 1940, 53 Hagv. L. REV. 863 (1940). He further stated in a press release of the

Department of Justice, March 15, 1940, in opposition to a bill then pending in Congress
which would have legalized wire tapping, "While I concede that the telephone tap is
from time to time of limited value in the criminal investigative field, I frankly and sincerely believe that if a statute of this kind were enacted the abuses arising therefrom
would far outweigh the value which might accrue to lav enforcement as a whole."
235With reference to Mr. Justice Holmes' labeling of wire tapping as "dirty business"
in his dissent in the Ohnstead case, Professor Wigmore says, "Kicking a man in the
stomach is 'dirty business',, normally viewed. But if a gunman assails you, and you
know enough of the French art of 'sabotage' to kick him in the stomach and thus save
your life, is that 'dirty business' for you?" 8 WIGIooa, EVIDEXCE § 2184 b (3d ed. 1940).
23640 STAT. 218, 50 U.S.C.A. § 32 (Supp. 1946).
23728 GEo. L. J.789 (1940).
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limitations the law may impose, the tapping of a telephone line will disclose
both ends of the conversation. A warrant may specify the line to be tapped,
but it cannot limit the subjects of conversation which are to be overheard
nor' the persons whose conversations will be publicized. Anyone speaking
to the suspect over the tapped line will open his business to the ears of the
law. Communications which are otherwise wrapped in privilege, as those
between attorney and client, may be revealed to the listener. The law forbids searches which are to be made solely in order to procure evidence ;23s
tapping a line even under warrant is as general, and therefore as obnoxious,
as an exploratory search. 239 Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olnstead v.
Uvited States expressed this view aptly when he said, "As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments
of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping." 240 Wire tapping is a much more dangerous instrument in the hands of the police than
the right of search and seizure, 'for abuses of the latter are known to the
victim and may lead to legal action or at least protest and adverse publicity.
On the other hand, persons whose messages have been intercepted are frequently unaware that this has occurred, unless an attempt is made to introduce evidence of the conversations on trial. They are therefore helpless to
protect themselves, and the police may employ it as they will without fear
of recrimination.
Opponents of official wire tapping point out that the invasion of the right
of privacy by use of this technique is no mere chimera, but an accomplished
fact brought about by the widespread adoption of this method by investigative
agencies. It is reported that the federal agencies train their own employees
in wire tapping and sometimes local police as well.24 1 It is further stated
that federal police, in the course of a single investigation, have tapped a
telephone wire "for months at a time" and "made thousands of mechanical
recordings". 24 The possible perversion of the practice is illustrated by an
238
See
239

Part II-A supra.
The right against general exploratory searches appears to have suffered serious
inroads as a result 'of the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Harris
v. United States, 330 U. S.386, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947). While expressing opposition
to such searches, the Court nevertheless held legal the seizure of unlawfully possessed
draft cards found concealed in a bureau drawer after a five hour search. No search
warrant was issued. The search leading to the discovery of the cards was conducted
by federal agents following the arrest of the defendant under a warrant of arrest issued
for an unrelated crime-violation of the Mail Fraud Statute.
240277 U. S.438, 476, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 571 (1928).
241 Wire Tapping, Congress and the Department of Justice, 9 INT'L. JIE)ID. Ass'N.
BuLL.
242 97, 100 (1941).
1d. at 99.
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excerpt from a report of a United States Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce recommending an investigation of wire tapping carried on against
public officials:
"Wire tapping, dictographing, and similar devices are especially dangerous at the present time, because of the recent resurgence of a spy
system conducted by Government police. Persons who have committed
no crime, but whose economic and political views and activities may be
obnoxious to the present incumbents of law-enforcement offices, are being investigated and catalogued [sic]. If information gathered from
such investigations is being obtained by wire tapping, dictographing, or
other reprehensible methods, and if it is some day offered as evidence
in a Federal criminal trial, the courts may have an opportunity to apply
the principles of the Boyd case and of the Nardone cases. But on the
other hand, the information may perhaps never be offered in such a case,
because the victims of wire tapping and similar methods may perhaps
never be charged with a crime. In this event, the information may be
used in extra-legal controversies where the courts may have no opportunity to adjudicate the matter. Wire tapping and other unethical devices may lead to a variety of oppressions that may never reach the ears
of the courts. They may, for example, have the effect of increasing the
power of law enforcement agencies to oppress factory employees who
are under investigation, not for any criminal action, but only by reason
of their views and activities in regard to labor unions and other economic
movements; this is no fanciful case-such investigations are a fact today.
In short, unauthorized and unlawful police objectives may be aided by
wire tapping and dictographing practices, the extent of which we are
not in243a position to estimate without a careful inquiry into all the
facts.,'

Finally, in addition to the dangers to the right of privacy and possible
infringement of personal liberties resulting from wire tapping as a device
for crime detection, it is contended that use by the government of a method
so generally detested would breed disrespect for the law. It is better, according to this'view, that some offenders escape the penalty for their crime
than that the government blacken itself in this manner. Those who adopt
this view conclude that it is impossible to draft a good law legalizing wire
tapping and that the only answer to the problem lies in enactment of statutes
similar to section 605 of the Federal Communications Act aimed at the abolition of official wire tapping.
If enforcement officers are restrained from wire tapping by statute, either
absolutely or qualifiedly', the question remains whether evidence secured by
2 43
SEN. REP. No. 1304, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 Senate Miscellaneous Reports, 76th
Cong., 2d and 3d Sessions (1940).
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interception of telephone communications in violation of law should be received by the courts. The various considerations shedding light on this problem have been more fully developed in the field of searches and seizures, but
they ;re equally applicable here and will therefore be borrowed from the
other source in order to present both sides of the controversy as fully as
possible. The arguments in favor of admitting evidence secured by unlawful
wire tapping may be summarized as follows:
1. Exclusion of the evidence violates the ancient rule that evidence is
admissible regardless of the manner in which it was obtained. The reason
behind this rule is a sound one, and supports its retention, namely, the court
will not interrupt the trial to determine a "collateral" issue, but will receive
all relevant evidence offered in order to do justice on the issue before it.
2. Evidence of intercepted conversations as it is usually offered in the
form of dictograph or phonograph records, is the most reliable evidence obtainable and particularly valuable therefore in proving the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
3. The terms of the statute are usually, as in the case of New York,
silent concerning the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of its provisions. The courts should not read into it a clause which the legislature
did not include.
4. The wire tapping statute was intended to operate on the departments
of government, not on private individuals. An officer violating its provisions
is acting outside the scope of his authority, and thereupon ceases to be a
'governmental agent for whose acts the state is responsible.
5. An officer who violates the wire tapping statute is subject to a civil
action instituted by the victim. of the act. He may also be punished criminally, or held for contempt of court, if he disobeyed a warrant, or demoted
or disciplined by his superior officer. The statute prohibiting or regulating
wire tapping should be enforced by one of these direct means rather than
indirectly by exclusion of the evidence.
6. Suppression of illegally intercepted conversations enables any law enforcement officer, by some negligent disregard of the prescribed procedure
for obtaining the warrant, to tie the hands of the court in determining the
guilt of an offender.
7. A court's "rejection of relevant proofs will often lead to freeing of
a dangerous criminal. This result does incalculable harm without in any way
compensating the victim of the illegal interceotion or punishing the guilty
officer.
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In opposition to these considerations, the following arguments have been
advanced :244
1. Interruption of the trial is not a reason for ignoring the illegal source
of evidence. It is customary to halt proceedings and exclude the jury whenever a question' of law arises concerning admissibility of the evidence.
2. A court, in receiving evidence of illegally intercepted conversations,
ratifies the act of the offending officer in acting outside the scope of his
authority. The judicial branch of the government cannot accept the fruits
of misconduct of the executive department without creating a general distrust of the law.
3. The right which the law seeks to protect in the provisions directed
against wire tapping is sufficiently important to warrant the escape df an
occasional offender, if necessary, in order to give it practical effect. Many
of the fundamental guarantees of personal liberties are enforced at an equal
cost-the right of confrontation, the reasonable doubt rule, even the right
to trial by jury.

24 5

4. Exclusion of illegally intercepted communications is the only practicable method of enforcing the .wire tapping statute. A penal sanction, if it
exists, will not be invoked. 246 Cases of illegal searches and seizures are innumerable, as shown by the many times the courts are confronted with the
244

This position is taken by 8 WIGMORE

EVIDENCE

§ 2184 (3d ed. 1940); Plumb,

Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 337 (1939) ; GREENMAN, WIRE TAPPING, ITS RELATION TO CiviL. LIbXRTIES 45 (1938) ; Patterson, A Case for Admitting
in 245
Evidence Liquor Illegally Seized, 3 ORE. L. REv. 334 (1924) ; 24 Ky. L. J. 191 (1936).

Commentators opposed to admission of illegally seized or intercepted evidence are
xUS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 8 (2d ed. 1930) ; Corwin, The Supreme Court's
Construction of the Self-Intcrimination Clause, 29 Micn. L. REv. 191 (1930); Atkinson,
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained through Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 25 COL.
L. REv. 11 (1925); Rosebraugh, A Case for the Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by
Illegal Search, 3 ORE. L. REV. 323 (1924) ; 16 TENN. L. REv. 470 (1940) ; 8 FORD. L.
REV. 110 (1939).
246
Senator Wagner, as delegate to the Constitutional Convention in 1938 said: "I have
no fear that the exclusionary rule will handicap the detection or prosecution of crime.
COR

All the arguments that have been made on that score seem to me to be properly directqd

not against the exclusionary rule but against the substantive guarantee itself. The exclusion of the evidence is only the sanction which makes the rule effective. It is the
rule, not the sanction, which imposes limits on the operation of the police. If the rule
is obeyed as it should be, and as we declare it should be, there will be no illegally obtained evidence to be excluded by the operation of this sanction.
"It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the exclusionary rule on the ground that
it will hamper the police, while making no challenge to the fundamental rules to which
the police are required to conform. If those rules, defining the scope of the search which
may be made without a warrant, the requirements which must be met to obtain a warrant once the scope of a search under a warrant are sound, there is no reason why they
should be violated or why a prosecuting attorney should seek to avail himself of the
fruits of their violation." 1 REv. RECORD OF N. Y. CONST. Cox. 560 (1938).
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question of admissibility of illegally seized evidence, and yet prosecutions of
officers for making the illegal seizures are extremely rare. The illegal act is
often performed at the direction or in pursuance of the policy of the head
of the department charged with law enforcement. At least it is committed
for the purpose of securing a conviction, which will make a better record
for the prosecutor. He cannot be expected, therefore, to invoke a penal sanction against a guilty subordinate. If the criminal act was done negligently
and not maliciously, too stern an attitude towards the offender might even
discourage enforcement of the law in cases where there may be any doubt
of legality.
The possibility of disciplinary measures is insufficient to deter the police
from making illegal interceptions, since the chief law enforcement officer
will be reluctant to proceed in this manner for the same reason that he refuses
to invoke penal sanctions.
Punishment of the offending officer for contempt of court is also inadequate as a remedy for an illegal interception. If the illegal act was a wilful
violation of a court order, the court would doubtless have jurisdiction to proceed against the responsible person for contempt. 247 The absence of any
person sufficiently interested to take the initiative in instituting the proceedings would, however, make this remedy ineffectual. In the most egregious
cases, those in which the wires are tapped without any attempt to comply
with the law by obtaining an order of the court, the offender would seem
to be beyond the reach of a contempt proceeding.
A civil action against an officer by the victim of any illegal interception
is no more feasible than other remedies. Where the tapping occurs on the
premises of the plaintiff, an action of trespass might be maintained, but the
injury to property is usually infinitesimal and would lay the foundation for
only nominal damages. In the more usual case where the tapping occurs
outside the premises, the plaintiff could claim invasion only of a right of
privacy. As previously noted, recovery has been allowed in two courts for
eavesdropping on private conversations on the theory that violation of this
right is actionable. It seems doubtful, however, whether it would be recognized in all jurisdictions. But whatever the theoretical right of the person
whose telephone wires have been tapped, it is certain that a jury would grant
him only nominal damages unless he could prove a substantial injury by the
disclosure of his business. The evidence necessary would often violate the
2 47

CORNELIUS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES §§ 8, 9 (2d ed. 1920); Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtaiied through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COL. L. REV.
11 (1925).
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very secrecy which he hoped to maintain. The expectation of nominal damages is insufficient to induce most persons to spend the time and money to
institute a civil action, regardless of the value of the right which they would
thus seek to protect. A person who had been indicted and convicted of a
crime would receive no consideration from a jury in any action of damages
which he might institute for illegal interception of messages which tended
to prove his guilt. The impediments in the way Of any recovery by an innocent victim of wire tapping would usually prove insurmountable. Out of the
many officers usually involved in an illegal wire tapping operation, it is difficult to choose as defendants those whom a jury would be likely to hold
responsible for the illegal act. If damages should be awarded, the defendant
would often be judgment proof.
In the light of these various considerations for and against exclusion of
evidence obtained by illegal interception, one conclusion concerning the law
of New York seems inescapable. This state has led the way in adopting a
policy of supervised wire tapping for the purposes of crime detection. This
was the considered position of the Constitutional Convention and the Legislature, and the arguments in its favor and in favor of an absolute prohibition.
against official wire tapping are so evenly balanced that in the absence of
clear-cut factual studies it is difficult to decide conclusively which is the
wiser course.
It is clear, however, that the right to be secure against unreasonable interceptions conferred by the New York Constitution and statutes is a hollow
right in the present status of the law. Its violation by a public officer is not
even punishable criminally. A penal sanction is not, however, sufficient to
give this right meaning if it rests with the chief prosecuting officer to enforce
it. It has been suggested that the weakness of a penal provision might be overcome by the adoption of a summary proceeding by which the court might take
the initiative in prosecuting the offending officer upon the affidavit of the injured party and hearing of the officer. 248 The proceeding would thus be set
in motion without the intervention of the department of law enforcement.
Serious objections might be raised, however, on the score of unconstitutionality to a proceeding, criminal in its nature, which denied the right to formal
indictment. 49
The soundest and most effective measure for giving meaning to the provisions against unreasonable wire tapping would be an express direction to
24
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the courts to exclude evidence secured by illegal interceptions.& 50 The knowledge that the fruits of forbidden wire tapping would be useless to them on
trial should cause the police to adhere strictly to the requirements of the
procedure for securing an ex parte order from the court authorizing tapping
of a particular line. To obviate the possibility that the blunder of the police
might mar the -usefulness of an entire wire tapping operation, the provision
for exclusion of the evidence might attempt some distinction between interceptions undertaken in violation of the fundamental right, as those where
no warrant was obtained or the warrant was void on its face, and interceptions made under a warrant inadvertently issued with a minor defect. This
distinction would discourage deliberate flouting of the law, but at the same
time, avoid freeing a criminal because of an oversight on the part of an
officer.
2OThis suggestion is offered on the assumption that the wire tapping provisions of
the New York Constitution and statutes are not invalid by reason of their conflict with
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. See Part IV, s'pra.

